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Abstract 
 
Research has approached the topic of safety in organizations from a number of different 
perspectives.  On the one hand, psychological research on safety climate gives evidence for a 
range of organizational factors that predict safety across organizations.  On the other hand, 
organizational learning theorists view safety as a dynamic problem in which organizations must 
learn from mistakes.  Here, we synthesize these two streams of research by incorporating key 
organizational factors from the safety climate literature into a dynamic simulation model that also 
includes the possibility for learning.  Analysis of simulation results sheds insight into the nature 
of reliability and confirms the dangers of over-reliance on ‘single loop learning’ as a mechanism 
for controlling safety behaviors.  Special emphasis is placed on strategies that managers might 
use to encourage learning and prevent erosion in safety behaviors over time.   
 
Introduction 
 
 Safety and the prevention of accidents is a topic that has interested both managers and 
organizational theorists for some time.  Accidents or violations of safety regulations are often 
reported in the news and can bring disastrous consequences to individuals, organizations and to 
society as a whole, from the loss of human life to a loss of public confidence in the services that 
organizations provide.  Recent notable examples include the deaths of several mine workers in 
Utah due to the alleged use of unsafe mining practices (Borenstein, 2007), and the death a subway 
worker in New York City who failed to follow regulations regarding the crossing of live tracks 
while performing maintenance (Neuman, 2007).  Similarly, in the United States conflict in Iraq, 
poor adherence to safety regulations has contributed to a large number of vehicle accidents, many 
of which have claimed soldiers’ lives (Minami & Madnick, 2007).  Less dramatic examples are 
even more common: for example, the Boston Globe reported that many high-end Boston 
restaurants consistently fail to observe safety regulations related to the preparation of food, 
despite the risk of infecting customers with food poisoning (Nelson and Hankinson, 2007).  Given 
the prevalence of news reports like these, the tremendous losses that organizations risk in the 
event of an accident, and the emphasis often placed on safety in public statements, why is it that 
so many organizations do such a poor job of adhering to safety regulations and preventing 
accidents?  
 
 Safety and Organizational Theory 
Organizational theorists have debated the topic of safety and accident prevention in 
organizations for some time.  On the one hand, Perrow (1984) argues that in certain ‘high hazard’ 
industries accident prevention may be impossible, despite the presence of regulations designed to 
prevent them.  Because in such “complex” organizations interactions between parts are numerous, 
slack is limited and processes are highly time dependent, individuals face an especially difficult 
time interpreting cues and responding adequately to potential dangers (Perrow, 1984).  In 
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response to this argument, others have argued instead that organizations, including those in high 
hazard industries, can be designed and can learn to undertake difficult tasks with reliability 
(Roberts, 1990; Weick, 1987).  Roberts (1990) defines “high reliability organizations” and 
suggests several strategies that these organizations use to overcome the deficiencies cited by 
Perrow, including culture, redundancy, continuous training, and organizational design.  Weick 
(1987) further argues that reliability can be developed through a culture of “storytelling” that 
encourages the exchange of rich and varied information through face to face communication.   
 
Social Psychology 
Consistent with this second view, there is also a rich literature in social psychology that 
identifies characteristics of organizations that promote safety.  Although the earliest 
psychological research on occupational safety emphasizes either human error or technical failure 
as the source of accidents, organizational factors are now widely recognized as having a high 
importance (Clarke, 2000).  A substantial portion of this work, beginning with Zohar’s (1980) 
influential study, draws on the notion of “safety climate” to explain the behavior of individuals 
with regard to safety.  Zohar defines climate as “perceptions that employees share about their 
work environment… that serve as a frame of reference for guiding appropriate and adaptive task 
behaviors (pg. 96).”  Climate is hypothesized to mediate the relationship between a number of 
organizational characteristics, including management commitment to safety, the openness of 
communication links, and the stability of the workforce, and safety behavior.  Thus, beyond the 
propensity of individuals to engage in safe acts independently, this research introduces the notion 
of a “shared cognition regarding safety” that can be established within organizations (pg. 101).        
Building on Zohar’s original work, a number of studies have developed measures for 
safety climate and verified the relationship between this construct and the safety behaviors of 
individuals within an organization.  Examples include Griffin & Neal (2000), Brown & Holmes 
(1986) in manufacturing, Hofmann & Stetzer (1996) in a chemical processing plant, and Mearns 
et al (1998) in a study of oil and gas production.  In addition, Zohar (2000) extends this construct 
by showing that it applies to groups, in addition to organizations as a whole, through the actions 
of supervisors.  Defining the organizational factors that predict safety climate has also received a 
lot of attention, with a focus especially on management commitment (Brown & Holmes, 1986; 
Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Huang et al, 2004), managers safety practices (Naveh et al, 2005), 
leadership style (Zohar, 2002; Barling 2002), work pressure or the conflict between production 
and safety (Diaz & Cabrera, 1997; Clarke, 2006), overall job satisfaction (Barling & Kelloway, 
2003), and the quality of communication or exchange relationships between managers and 
employees (Hoffman & Morgeson, 1999).   
 In addition to the construct of safety climate, which emphasizes shared perceptions, a 
related concept of safety culture has also gained popularity in the literature.  Drawing on 
established theories of organizational culture (Schein, 1985), this research looks beyond specific 
perceptions regarding safety to consider also more general “basic assumptions” that can shape 
safety behavior (Guldenmund, 2000).  Along these lines, Pidgeon (1991) argues that a “good 
safety culture” will include not only positive norms and attitudes regarding safety, but also a basic 
reflexivity that allows organizations to discover and learn about potential new hazards (Pidgeon, 
1991, cited in Clarke, 2000).  Weick’s (1987) notion of “culture as a source of high reliability,” 
noted above, is very similar.  Despite this broader theoretical foundation for culture, however, 
much safety research continues to operationalize ‘culture’ as “shared attitudes towards safety 
(Clarke, 2000, pg. 68),” a notion that is not inconsistent with safety climate.  For example, 
Cheyne et al (2002) include a measure of ‘attitude’ in their study of safety climate in two 
manufacturing firms, and conclude that “general attitudes to safety” do influence safety behavior 
and may also be seen to “facilitate climate change.”  
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 Organizational Learning 
 While the literature on safety climate and safety culture goes a long way towards 
explaining variation in safety practices across organizations, scholars have also had a lot to say 
about how individual organizations can develop cultures of safety, and why such efforts often 
fail.  In most of the safety climate literature, the question of implementation is not considered, 
under the implicit assumption that implementation requires little more than the right management 
actions.  For example, this research suggests that to improve safety, managers should place a high 
emphasis on it, model safe practices, foster effective communication, and limit work pressure to 
within manageable levels.  Reason (1998) goes so far as to suggest that a safety culture may be 
“socially engineered” (pg. 302) by way of reporting systems and management practices that 
encourage documentation of “near misses.” According to Reason’s model of accidents (Reason, 
1990), organizational factors that weaken organizational defenses against accidents (what he 
terms the “latent” pathway of accident causation) can be proactively identified and corrected 
(Clarke, 2000).   
 In opposition to this view, others have argued that in fact the implementation of a culture 
of safety is not such an easy task.  Here, the focus shifts from prescribing elements of an effective 
safety culture to managers to an examination of why it is that organizations so often fail to learn 
from mistakes.  In Weick’s words, organizations should be viewed not as “decision makers” but 
instead as “interpretation systems that generate meaning (Weick, 1987, pg. 123).”  While norms 
of open communication can enable effective interpretation, individuals’ ability to interpret events 
can also be quite limited, particularly in the context of learning from mistakes.   Crucially, 
individuals and organizations have a tendency to overemphasize “human error” when placing 
blame, rather than looking beyond to the social and cultural systems that most often also play a 
role – an example of the fundamental attribution error (Carroll, 1993).  This is especially 
significant given the preponderance of organizational factors shown to influence safety climate 
and safety culture.  If organizations routinely fail to recognize these larger sources of error, it is 
not surprising that mistakes can go uncorrected.   
 The distinction between ‘single loop’ and ‘double loop’ learning (Argyris, Putnam & 
Smith, 1985) is another useful characterization of the trap that organizations sometimes fall into 
with regard to learning.  Single loop learning represents the immediate and local actions that 
individuals and organizations take in response to a perceived problem.  For example, following an 
accident, such actions might include increasing enforcement of existing rules and procedures to 
prevent a reoccurrence of the same accident (Caroll, Rudolph & Hatakenaka, 2002).  Double loop 
learning, on the other hand, represents the kind of learning in which assumptions are challenged 
and mental models are adjusted.  Here, instead of focusing on enforcement, individuals might 
question why rules were not originally followed, whether the existing rules are effective, and 
whether other underlying causes of an accident might exist (Caroll, Rudolph & Hatakenaka, 
2002).  Clearly, this second type of learning presents the greatest potential benefit in terms of 
increased organizational safety.   
 Despite this potential, double loop learning presents a difficult challenge to organizations.  
For one, this type of learning threatens existing bureaucratic structures and the control system of 
the organization (Caroll, Rudolph & Hatakenaka, 2002).  More importantly, in a dynamic sense 
the immediate success of single loop learning can undermine both the motivation and the 
perceived need to follow through on more substantial improvement efforts (Repenning & 
Sterman, 2002; Tucker & Edmondsen, 2003).  For example, Tucker & Edmondson (2003) argue 
that because of the gratification that hospital nurses receive from solving problems quickly and 
efficiently using ‘first order’ means these nurses are less motivated to raise underlying issues with 
superiors.  Similarly, increasing utilization of a plant will yield immediate improvements in 
output, reducing the perceived need to take poorly performing equipment down to fix underlying 
maintenance problems (Repenning & Sterman, 2000).  In the context of safety, focusing on 
compliance while blaming individuals for accidents reduces managers’ anxiety (Carroll, 1993).   
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 Thus, two streams of literature provide complementary insights into the problem of safety 
in organizations.  On the one hand, psychological research on safety climate and safety culture 
illustrates a range of organizational variables that can impact safety behavior.  This research does 
not, however, answer the dynamic question of how safety in an organization can be improved, or 
why in some instances safety culture may erode over time.  Research in organizational learning 
addresses this gap, highlighting the challenges that organizations face in learning from mistakes 
in fundamental ways.  Too often, though, research in organizational learning focuses on the 
learning process rather than seeking to draw general lessons regarding the organizational factors 
that promote safety.  While certainly the challenges that organizations face and the causes for 
particular accidents are likely to be unique and highly context dependent, research on safety 
culture suggests that general lessons may also exist.  For example, if it is known that management 
commitment and production pressure are strong predictors of safety, how do these variables relate 
to an organization’s ability to learn and sustain improvements in the long run?   
 
 Dynamic Simulation 
 To integrate these two streams of research, we make use of a dynamic simulation model, 
using the System Dynamics methodology (Sterman, 2000).  System dynamics has been used 
successfully on numerous occasions to model the experience of particular organizations with 
regard to safety and accidents (Leveson et al, 2005; Cooke, 2003; Minami & Madnick, 2007), and 
to generate more general theory concerning both the causes of disaster (Rudolph & Repenning, 
2002), and accident prevention (Cooke & Rohleder, 2006).  In addition, causal loop 
diagramming, a subset of System Dynamics that entails the generation of qualitative models of 
feedback relationships, has been used by a number of authors to explain the erosion of safety 
behaviors (Marais et al, 2006) and the difficulty that organizations have in learning from mistakes 
(Senge, 1990; Sterman, 1994; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003).   
 Studies using System Dynamics to study safety have made a number of important 
theoretical contributions.  In the most general sense, Rudolph & Repenning (2002) show that the 
stock (or accumulation) of interruptions facing organizational actors, and not the severity of any 
one interruption, most contributes to the occurrence of a disaster or adverse event.  This emphasis 
on stocks and flows is central to the System Dynamics method.  In addition, System Dynamics 
highlights the role of feedback in leading complex organizations towards often unanticipated 
outcomes.  For example, Minami & Madnick (2007) argue that short term efforts to enforce 
safety behaviors among combat troops may also encourage fatigue and complacency in the long 
run, thereby undermining the original policy.  Similarly, Leveson et. al (2005) use a System 
Dynamics model to describe and analyze safety culture at NASA during the time leading up to 
the Columbia disaster, and find that periods of apparent success can encourage heightened risk 
taking and complacency towards new safety investments.  Cooke (2003) investigates similar 
dynamics in a comprehensive model of a production setting (the Westray mine), and shows how 
the pressure to produce contributes to feedback that undermines safety.   
Unlike these studies that model the experience of a particular organization, our approach 
instead is to capture general relationships that are known to exist across a range of organizations, 
drawing particularly from the safety climate literature and qualitative models of organizational 
learning.   We go beyond most qualitative models, however, by placing them within a 
mathematical simulation of the “physical structure” of task accomplishment within an 
organization (Repenning & Sterman, 2002).  In particular, we show that this physical structure, 
and the related notion of ‘production pressure,’ can have a significant influence on the ability of 
an organization to learn, regardless of the strength of communication norms that may exist, and 
that the role of decision makers with regard to production pressure is crucial to fostering a culture 
of learning.  Along these lines, we also develop an improved understanding of “management 
safety actions,” “management commitment,” and “safety priority,” concepts from the safety 
culture literature that are not usually thought of in a dynamic sense.  A dynamic model shows 
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why commitment to safety must involve more than simply enforcing rules and should also 
recognize the time that is required to complete safety tasks.   
In the next section, we describe the assumptions and structure of the proposed model of 
organizational safety.  Then, we provide an analysis of the model behavior, with particular 
attention towards relevant insights and the range of outcomes that are possible.   
 
A Dynamic Model of Safety 
  At the heart of most organizations’ attempts to prevent accidents and build a culture of 
safety are rules and procedures that individuals and organizations are expected to follow.  
Adherence to rules and procedures is an important component of safety climate; for example, 
Zohar uses a questionnaire to measure safety climate that includes several questions explicitly 
related to following rules (Zohar, 2000, pg. 591).  High hazard organizations are especially 
compliance focused, with the need to satisfy regulators and prevent accidents - leading to detailed 
analysis and structuring of work (Carroll, Rudolph & Hatakenaka, 2002).  As a result, a central 
construct in our model is ‘adherence to rules and procedures’, and this is assumed to have a 
positive effect on safety behavior, which in turn has a negative influence on the incident rate.   It 
should be noted that we intentionally use the term “incident rate” rather than “accident rate”; this 
broader definition includes any abnormal event that could have the potential to lead to an 
accident, and that could also serve as the basis for either management action or learning (Cooke 
& Rohleder, 2006).   
 The evidence is also clear that adherence to rules and procedures alone will not prevent 
incidents.  Certainly, Weick’s notion of reliability is far broader; for example, reliability must 
also include the ability to handle the “unanticipated effects of emotional, social, and interpretive 
processes (1987, pg. 114),” the strength of communication norms, and the ability to learn and use 
learning to guide new routines (Carroll, Rudolph & Hatakenaka, 2002).  Similarly, in the safety 
climate literature Katz-Navon, Naveh & Stern (2005) argue that the relationship between rules 
and procedures is curvi-linear, due to the costs of added complexity that come with too many 
rules.  For all of these reasons, we introduce a second causal driver of safety behavior, termed the 
“effectiveness of rules and procedures.”  Broadly, this variable represents the outcome of learning 
and the general effectiveness of organizational safety routines and procedures, assuming full 
“adherence.”  Thus, even if adherence is 100%, this formulation allows for the possibility that the 
rules themselves are flawed, by way of a low value for “effectiveness of rules and procedures.” 
Figure 1 shows the base causal structure of incidents that is used in the model.   
Incident RateEffectiveness ofSafety Behavior
Adherence to Rules
and Procedures
+
Effectiveness of
Rules and
Procedures
+ -
 
Figure 1: Basic causal structure for the Incident Rate 
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Individual Risk and Self Preservation 
 System Dynamics models are based on the concept of feedback.  Negative feedback 
loops are “homeostatic processes” that bring system behavior towards a desired state, while 
positive feedback loops “amplify deviations” and cause exponential growth (Sterman, 2000).  
Figure 2 shows one simple balancing feedback loop regarding organizational  safety, labeled 
‘self preservation.’  The logic of this loop is as follows: an increase in the incident rate causes an 
increase in perceived personal threat, causing a greater adherence to rules and procedures, more 
effective safety behavior, and a lower incident rate.  Thus, the incident rate is partly controlled 
through this balancing process of individuals recognizing the risk and adjusting their behavior.   
 
Incident Rate
Effectiveness of
Safety Behavior
Adherence to Rules
and Procedures
Effectiveness of
Rules and
Procedures
+
-
Perceived
Personal Threat+
+B
Self
Preservation
 
Figure 2: The ‘Self-Preservation’ Balancing Loop 
 
 In the extreme case, the evidence for this ‘self-preservation’ loop is intuitive: individuals 
will act to preserve their own safety.  As a mechanism for maintaining an incident rate that is 
acceptable to organizations, however, the evidence suggests that self-preservation is not effective.  
Zohar and Erev (2007) argue that a number of individual biases work to discourage safe behavior 
during routine work, including melioration bias (delayed outcomes), rare or uncertain outcomes, 
and social externalities.  As a result, safety behavior is largely a function of management 
pressures and rewards.   
 Still, there is some evidence for a weak effect of self preservation.  If individuals hold 
previous encounters or training related to specific threats, they will be more likely to participate 
in safety programs (Goldberg, et. al, 1991).  In addition, employees will practice safe behaviors if 
they believe they have control over safe outcomes (Huang, et. al, 2004).  As a result, we include 
‘self preservation’ as a weak balancing loop that is most effective at high incident rates.   
 
Management Safety Actions 
 Much of the safety literature acknowledges a large role for management actions in 
preventing accidents.  Dimensions include perceived management attitudes to safety (Zohar, 
1980), management concern (Brown & Holmes, 1986), management commitment (Dedobbeleer 
& Beland, 1991), management actions (Cox, et. al, 1998), and senior management support 
(Gershon, 2000).  To take one example, Huang et. al (2004) define supervisor support as “the 
extent to which supervisors encourage safe working practices among their subordinates (pg. 
485),” and construct a measure using two questions, one directed at positive reinforcement (“My 
supervisor acknowledges when I work safety”) and another at negative reinforcement (“My 
supervisor tells me when I am not working safely”).  Research has also examined the impact of 
leadership style on safety, with evidence favoring “transformational” leadership over “corrective” 
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leadership (Zohar, 2002; Barling, 2002).  In most cases, leadership and management actions have 
been found to be highly significant predictors of safety climate and the accident rate (eg. Barling, 
2002).  Zohar (2007) goes as far as to argue that the “key to success” in ensuring safe behavior 
“lies in providing frequent, personally meaningful, and immediate rewards for safe conduct, 
overriding the costs associated with that behavior and exceeding the benefits of unsafe behavior 
(pg. 122).”   
 To incorporate management action into a dynamic model of safety, we distinguish 
between two balancing feedback mechanisms, designed to correspond again with Zohar’s (2000) 
two factor measure of safety climate.  The first of these is what Zohar terms “supervisory action,” 
and refers to “overt supervisor reaction to subordinate conduct (pg. 591).”  As above, this factor 
includes both positive and negative reinforcement.  Translated into feedback terms, Figure 3 
shows an additional balancing loop labeled ‘Management Safety Actions’: when the incident rate 
rises above acceptable levels, managers respond with direct action so as to control safety behavior 
and keep the incident rate within an acceptable range.   
 The balancing loop ‘Management Safety Action’ is also consistent with theories of 
organizational learning.  Specifically, this loop represents a prominent example of ‘single loop’ 
learning (Argyris, Putnam & Smith, 1985) or of ‘first order problem solving’ (Tucker & 
Edmondon, 2003).  When faced with an incident rate that is too high, the natural and most 
immediately effective response for managers is to focus the blame on individual compliance with 
rules.  Carroll, Rudolph & Hatakenaka (2002) provide an excellent example of this type of 
response: following an incident in which a maintenance worker falls off of a ladder, the accident 
report found that “the cause of the accident was a failure of the employee, the employee in 
charge, and the supervisor to properly follow the Accident Prevention Manual requirements for 
working in elevated positions.”  Next steps included “appointing a full time safety person” so as 
to better “communicate company expectations (pg. 19).”  This example suggests that enforcing 
adherence to rules and procedures by overt means is a method often used by managers to develop 
a positive safety climate.   
 
Incident Rate
Effectiveness of
Safety Behavior
Adherence to Rules
and Procedures
Effectiveness of
Rules and
Procedures
+
-
Perceived
Personal Threat+
+B
Self
Preservation
Management
Emphasis on Safety
+
Incident Rate Relative
to Acceptable Incident
Rate
+
+
Acceptable
Incident Rate
+
B
Management
Safety Actions
 
Figure 3: The ‘Management Safety Actions’ Balancing Loop 
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 The second factor in Zohar’s (2000) measure of safety climate is “expectation” regarding 
supervisory action.  This is closely linked to the “safety vs. productivity” tradeoff (pg. 591), and 
is measured via survey items such as “whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor wants us to 
work faster, rather than by the rules” and “as long as there is no accident, my supervisor doesn't 
care how the work is done.”  In contrast to management safety actions, expectations are expected 
to convey a more general sense of the “overriding priority” of safety within an organization (pg. 
595).  Thus, “priority” has come to symbolize the relative importance of safety tasks in relation to 
other demands that workers face, with a high priority indicating that safety tasks will be given 
precedence even when work pressures are high (Katz-Navon, et al, 2002).  Numerous studies 
have documented the importance of performance pressure as a predictor of safety behavior 
(Wright, 1986; Embrey, 2002; Katz-Navon, et. al, 2002; Clarke, 2006).   
 Two important feedback loops are introduced by this discussion (Figure 4).  The first, 
labeled ‘Cutting Back on Safety’ represents the natural response that employees have to work 
pressure when safety is not a priority.  If work requirements increase, production pressure will 
also increase, causing adherence to safety rules and procedures to fall until work demands are in 
line with what individuals are capable of completing.  Evidence for the existence of this loop is 
strong, and includes both quantitative studies that show a relationship between production 
pressure and safety, and qualitative studies that document how individuals may cut corners when 
under time pressure (Wright, 1986; Oliva & Sterman, 2001).   
 The second feedback loop introduced in Figure 4, labeled ‘Safety Priority,’ represents the 
response that managers might take when expectations regarding safety are high.  Here, work 
requirements are no longer exogenous, but instead reflect the safety needs of the organization.  
Thus, in a high priority environment, work requirements must necessarily fall when the safety 
needs of the organization rise, so as to contain the incident rate within acceptable levels.  The 
positive correlation between safety priority, defined as the adherence to procedures even when 
under pressure, and safety climate (Zohar, 2000) suggests that in fact this loop is active in high 
performing organizations.   
As with the ‘Management Safety Actions’ loop, ‘Safety Priority’ is also consistent with 
research in organizational learning.  If ‘Management Safety Actions’ are examples of ‘first order’ 
problem solving or single loop learning, safety priority may represent one additional level of 
learning in response to incidents.  (Although it is important to note that this is not yet ‘double 
loop’ learning in the sense defined above).  For example, in the hospital nurse example cited 
earlier (Tucker & Edmondson, 2003), nurses often failed to report incidents to superiors in part 
due to a culture of independence and efficiency that had developed.  The notion of safety priority 
is directly opposed to this concern for efficiency: if safety priority were high, nurse task 
requirements would instead reflect the need to follow through on problems that emerge, even if 
doing so required taking time away from regular work.  Similarly, Edmondson (2002) argues that 
“reflective sessions where task and time pressure are temporarily removed” are important to 
psychological safety and the process of team learning.  Thus, we hypothesize that the ‘Safety 
Priority’ loop is one important mechanism that organizations might use to prevent accidents and 
develop a culture of safety.   
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Incident Rate
Effectiveness of
Safety Behavior
Adherence to Rules
and Procedures
Effectiveness of
Rules and
Procedures
+
-
Perceived
Personal Threat+
+B
Self
Preservation
Management
Emphasis on Safety
+
Incident Rate Relative
to Acceptable Incident
Rate
+
+
Acceptable
Incident Rate
+
B
Management
Safety Actions
Production
Pressure
-
Safety Task
Requirements
+
Work
Requirements
Total Task
Requirements
+
Priority given to
safety tasks
+
-
+
+
B
Safety Priority
B
Cutting Back on
Safety
Exogenous work
demands
+
 
Figure 4: The ‘Safety Priority’ and ‘Cutting Back on Safety’ Balancing Loops 
 
Organizational Learning 
 Of course, team learning and organizational learning involve far more than reducing time 
pressures so that existing rules and procedures can be followed.  In addition, a large part of 
learning must involve generating new knowledge and routines in response to new challenges that 
will inevitably arise.  Again, Weick’s (1987) notion of reliability rests on rich communication 
between individuals, so as to generate “requisite variety” that enhances each individual’s ability 
to perceive and act on information cues.  In addition, Carroll, Rudolph & Hatakenaka (2002) 
argue that a focus solely on compliance is overly controlling, and as such may alienate workers.   
 As a result, reliable organizations must have additional feedback mechanisms in place 
that extend beyond simple adherence to rules and procedures.  We suggest above that the term 
‘effectiveness of rules and procedures,’ defined in the broadest sense possible, may capture some 
of the results of learning in high reliability organizations.  To use Weick’s model, we assume that 
in an organization that possesses a strong safety culture, incidents lead to the generation of a 
shared stock of knowledge that can aid in the reliable performance of daily tasks, thus making 
rules and procedures more “effective” and leading to fewer incidents.  This specification also 
depends upon the broad definition for “incidents” mentioned above and an even broader 
definition for learning, such that “learning from incidents” goes beyond simple trial and error.  
Admittedly, this loop lacks a great deal of the richness characteristic of most theories of 
organizational learning, but nevertheless we believe it to be a good starting point for the 
investigation of model behavior.   
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Incident Rate
Effectiveness of
Safety Behavior
Adherence to Rules
and Procedures
Effectiveness of
Rules and
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+
-
Perceived
Personal Threat+
+B
Self
Preservation
Management
Emphasis on Safety
+
Incident Rate Relative
to Acceptable Incident
Rate
+
+
Acceptable
Incident Rate
+
B
Management
Safety Actions
Organizational
Safety Knowledge
Learning from
Incidents
+
+
+
B
Organizational
Learning
 
Figure 5: The ‘Organizational Learning’ Balancing Loop 
 
Model Specification 
 We next incorporate each of the feedback loops described above into a mathematical 
simulation model of a generic organization, using the System Dynamics methodology (Sterman, 
2000).  Figure 6 shows the main stock and flow structure of task completion; detailed equation 
listings are provided in the appendix.  Here, tasks are defined in a deliberately broad sense, to 
mean any work activities that must be completed. In System Dynamics models, ‘stocks’ are 
shown as rectangles and represent the memory of the system, flows represent the rate of change 
of stocks, and auxiliary variables are used to compute flows for each step that the simulation is 
run.  In this example, new tasks flow into the “Task Backlog” stock, and flow out according to 
task completion.  Task completion is in turn a function of capacity, capacity utilization, and the 
time required per task.   
This structure is linked to the feedback loops shown above in two ways.  First, adherence 
to rules and procedures determines the time required to complete tasks and thus the desired work 
rate (measured in hours per week).   Second, the desired work rate (which is a function of 
backlog, desired completion time, and time required per task) together with capacity determine 
schedule or production pressure, one of the key drivers of adherence to rules and procedures.  In 
sum, this simple model allows us to examine organizational responses to accidents in the context 
of the physical structure of task completion, an endeavor that is much more difficult using only 
qualitative theories.  The generic structure used is very similar to that used in other System 
Dynamics models of organizations (see for example Sterman, 2000; Sterman, Henderson et. al, 
2007; Paich & Sterman, 1993).   
 Two additional feedback loops are introduced by the task completion structure.  The first 
is straightforward: as task backlog increases, schedule pressure increases causing capacity 
utilization to rise accordingly.  The second loop, labeled ‘hire more people,’ however, deserves 
some mention.  Operationally, this loop represents any hiring, firing, or transferring of staff such 
that over time, capacity matches desired capacity.  Adherence to rules and procedures determines 
the amount of work that must be completed, which determines the desired staff level and - after a 
delay - the actual capacity of the organization.  Given that in many organizations, this adjustment 
can in effect be quite slow, due to the strains involved with training new employees or the 
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pressures against layoffs, we choose a time constant for this adjustment that is reasonably long (6 
months).   
Beyond explicit hiring and firing, though, there is a broader meaning to this feedback 
process.  Specifically, this loop represents the chief means by which safety practices become 
institutionalized into the memory of the system.  Whether through hiring, firing, or simply the 
way that time is used, over time the capacity of the organization to complete tasks will adjust to 
established norms regarding how long tasks take.  Crucially, the amount of time that tasks take 
necessarily reflects the amount of effort that is put towards safety.  This result corresponds to the 
observation that “unsafe behaviors and routines can become ‘normal’ or habitual, in the sense that 
everyone does them (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996, pg. 310, citing Wright, 1986).”  A very similar 
result is established empirically by Oliva & Sterman (2001), who develop a System Dynamics 
model of backlog and order fulfillment in a call center.  Over time, service quality (measured as 
the average time per call) declines, resulting in both lower standards and lower capacity to handle 
future calls.  In a sense, we hypothesize the existence of a similar dynamic for the case of 
organizational safety, with safety standards as analogous to Oliva & Sterman’s notion of service 
quality.   
This feedback loop is also crucial to the model’s treatment of complacency, a concept 
that is central to many accounts of safety behavior in organizations (Minami & Madnick, 2007; 
Leveson, 2005).  If the incident rate is low for an extended period of time and safety is not 
deliberately given a high priority by managers, adherence will gradually fall as individuals 
respond to production pressure and the demands of daily tasks.  An organization becomes 
complacent, however, as these changes are institutionalized in desired staff and, after a delay, in 
capacity.  As soon as capacity reflects new assumptions about time per task, production pressures 
reflect this new state, making re-adherence to safety more and more difficult.  Thus, as it is 
modeled here, a falling incident rate does contribute to increased complacency over time in the 
absence of management attention to safety.   
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Figure 6: The Stock and Flow structure of Task Completion  
 
The stock and flow structure for adherence to rules and procedures is shown in Figure 7.  
Adherence is also modeled as a stock, reflecting the fact that individual actions form habits that 
change only gradually, especially in the context of large, bureaucratic organizations.  As the 
preceding analysis suggests, three forces influence adherence: personal threat, management 
emphasis, and production pressure.  The sum of these threats determines the fractional change in 
adherence, and as long as this sum is positive, adherence will gradually increase until the pressure 
is relieved, according to a standard hill climbing heuristic (Sterman, 2000, pg. 537).  Similarly, 
when the sum is negative, adherence will fall.  For example, if production pressure is positive, in 
the absence of other pressures adherence will gradually decrease, freeing resources until pressure 
is at a more manageable level.  The variables “Maximum Increase in Adherence” and “Minimum 
time to increase adherence” are included to ensure that adherence remains between 0 and 100 %.  
A complete listing of model equations is provided in the appendix.   
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Figure 7: The Stock and Flow Structure of Adherence 
 
Model Analysis and Results 
 Next, we present an analysis of select model results, designed to show the relative 
influence of each of the balancing mechanisms, detailed above, that organizations might use to 
prevent accidents and build a culture of safety.  We start with the simplest mechanisms, self 
preservation and overt management action, and move through those mechanisms that we might 
expect to find in organizations with more sophisticated approaches towards safety.   
 
1) Self-Preservation Alone 
 Figure 8 shows model results for a run in which only self preservation is active.  
Beginning in month five, there is a 5% step increase in the rate of new tasks, causing a rise in 
backlog and therefore a rise in production pressure.  The rise in production pressure causes 
adherence to rules and procedures to fall to meet completion goals.  In this example, the 
incident rate rises above the self preservation threshold, which is assumed to be four incidents 
per month.  As a result, there is a slight rise in adherence as individuals react to the unsafe 
environment.  However, self preservation alone is not sufficient to bring the incident rate 
back to within levels that are acceptable to the organization.  Thus, this behavior is consistent 
with the expectation that self preservation has a weak but insufficient influence on accident 
prevention.   
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Figure 8: Model results for a step increase in new tasks. When self-preservation is the only 
active mechanism, the increased production pressure leads to a permanently higher 
equilibrium incident rate.   
 
2) Adding Management Safety Actions 
In Figure 9, the same step increase in the rate of new tasks is simulated, only now a 
second balancing loop is added in the form of overt management safety actions (as shown 
above in Figure 3).  The red line represents the previous run with self-preservation alone, and 
the blue represents the behavior after management actions are added.  From the graphs, the 
added influence of management pressure is clear.  Now, the incident rate and adherence 
return to a point close to their starting values, as management pressure persists until this goal 
is achieved.  The difference is also shown in the graph for capacity: because management 
pressure forces adherence to rise back to its original level, capacity must increase to meet the 
new, raised demand.  In contrast, when self preservation alone is active, part of the increased 
demand is satisfied by cutting corners on safety tasks.   
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Figure 9: Model Results for a step increase in new tasks.  When management safety actions are 
also taken, the incident rate returns to equilibrium, but an increase in capacity is required to 
complete additional tasks.   
   
The results shown in Figure 9 also illustrate the notion of bounded rationality on the part 
of managers (Cyert & March, 1963).  The theory of bounded rationality states that in complex 
organizations, rather than solve for the globally optimal response, individuals with limited 
mental models will instead search for satisfactory outcomes that are consistent with only a 
small subset of feedbacks, usually those for which time delays are small (Cyert & March, 
1963; Sterman, 2000b).  The ubiquity of ‘single loop learning’ focused on short term, overt 
reactions to accidents has been discussed; Figure 9 shows precisely why such a response is 
intendedly rational on the part of managers.  In a simplified system in which demand exhibits 
only a single step increase and only feedback through self preservation and management 
action are active, an overt response is entirely effective in bringing the incident rate back to 
an acceptable level.  Thus, the partial model test supports the actions that managers 
sometimes take along these lines (see Morecroft, 1985 for a full discussion of bounded 
rationality and partial model testing of System Dynamics models).   
 Is a policy of overt management safety action similarly effective in a more complex 
system?  Figure 10 begins to explain why the answer to this question is ‘No.’ Here, instead of 
a step increase in demand, beginning in month 5 demand follows a pattern of stochastic noise, 
with a standard deviation of 5% and a mean that remains constant at the original value.  As 
the blue line indicates, at first the incident rate remains roughly equivalent to its base value, 
with only small fluctuations.  At around time 20, however, a sudden random increase in 
backlog causes the system to begin a slow deterioration.  Adherence falls and the incident 
rate rises, as the lower level of adherence becomes institutionalized in the form of lower 
capacity.  The balancing loop ‘Hire more people’ (Figure 6) is crucial to understanding this 
behavior: during each period that backlog rises, norms concerning safety gradually slip, 
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resulting in a slow deterioration in safety standards over time.  Management action can partly 
counteract this trend, as evidenced by the sharp periods of increase in adherence, but eroding 
goals cause production pressure to remain high, making a full recovery almost impossible.  
While a step increase in the rate of new tasks can send a clear signal that more capacity is 
needed, here, each small increase in the rate of new tasks causes further erosion in the 
incident rate before the organization knows to respond.  The performance is worse in the 
“noise” run despite the fact that the mean arrival rate of new tasks remains constant, unlike 
the “step” run where the mean increases.  These results show that a policy of relying solely 
on overt management pressure to ensure safety, although intendedly rational in a simple 
system, is not robust even for a small change in the form of the demand.   
Notably, this analysis neglects several other added complexities that further undermine 
strategies focused solely on ‘single loop learning,’ several of which are discussed above.  
Examples include the gradual erosion of trust due to an overemphasis on compliance (Carroll, 
Rudolph, & Hatakenaka, 2002), the failure to question underlying causes of accidents, or the 
failure to develop a culture of reliability, to use Weick’s sense of the term.  For all of these 
reasons, a strategy of compliance only, while effective for a simple system, does not 
withstand the test of a more complex and realistic system.   
 
 
Figure 10: Model results for a comparison  between stochastic noise in the rate of new tasks and 
a step increase in the rate of new tasks.  When demand is noisy, a series of small increases in 
production pressure cause adherence to safety procedures to gradually erode.  In contrast, a step 
increase eventually sends a clear signal that more resources are needed.   
 
3) Making Safety a High Priority 
 The safety climate literature provides evidence that in addition to overt action, managers 
may also improve safety by encouraging individuals to complete safety tasks regardless of 
other work pressures that may exist.  We next simulate this ‘high safety priority’ policy for 
the same pattern of demand introduced above (stochastic noise with a standard deviation of 
5%), to investigate whether a similar erosion in safety occurs.  Now, starting at time 5 the 
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desired capacity shown in Figure 6 is independent of adherence to rules and procedures, and 
is instead calculating by assuming that adherence will be 100%.   
 As expected, safety priority has a large influence on the incident rate.  By allocating 
resources under the assumption of full adherence, capacity necessarily grows, but the result is 
lower production pressure, greater adherence, and a lower incident rate.  Notably the 
volatility in incidents is also far less under this policy: during periods that backlog and 
schedule pressure rise, erosion is contained by continuing to maintain the same expectation 
regarding the time required per task.  Interestingly, the decreased volatility may be consistent 
with findings that safety priority moderates relationships between other safety variables (eg., 
Katz-Navon, et al, 2005).  For example, higher safety priority and lower volatility implies 
that over time, the incident rate is less responsive to changes in work pressure and to overt 
management action.  Although this is not the equivalent of comparing across organizations, it 
is interesting that cross sectional studies do find, for example, a weaker influence of 
management safety practices when safety priority is high (Katz-Navon, et al, 2005).   
Finally, it is important to note that a policy of high safety priority comes at a cost of far 
lower average productivity, where productivity is defined as tasks completed per month per 
person.  By definition, safety tasks are ‘extra’ work that require time but that are not 
necessary to the production of final output.  Thus, completing more safety tasks increases the 
total time per task and lowers productivity.  This analysis omits additional feedback that 
might enhance productivity in the long run: for example, in some cases employees might 
eventually become more productive (in a broad sense) in an environment that they know is 
safe.   
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Figure 11: Comparison between a reactive approach to safety (management safety actions), and 
an approach where safety is always given a high priority. A high priority means increasing 
capacity in response to task demand, such that safety tasks are still completed.  A higher 
adherence to safety tasks necessarily means a lower productivity (tasks/person/month) on regular 
tasks.    
 
4) Adding organizational learning 
 Finally, learning is added to the model.  First, we activate feedback through learning 
without making safety a high priority, to investigate whether norms of communication and 
learning alone can prevent erosion in safety.  Figure 12 shows that although learning increases the 
effectiveness of rules and procedures and reduces the incident rate, there is still significant 
erosion in safety over time.  Somewhat counter intuitively, increases in effectiveness are 
accompanied by lower adherence, meaning that the overall decrease in the incident rate is far less 
than it might be.  The reason for lower adherence is that higher effectiveness weakens the 
perceived need for an organizational response through other means, such as overt management 
emphasis.  In addition, without making safety a high priority work pressures remain, causing the 
same drop in adherence during periods of high backlog.  In sum, learning has some benefits, but 
as long as safety remains a low priority relative to task completion, volatility and erosion in safety 
standards persist.   
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Figure 12: Adding organizational learning, under an assumption of a low safety priority.  In this 
case, learning leads to more effective rules and procedures but only a slight decrease in the 
incident rate, due to declining adherence.    
 
 What if safety is again given a high priority?  As expected, Figure 13 shows that under 
this set of assumptions, safety performance exceeds all other scenarios shown above.  The 
incident rate falls to its lowest level, and also loses the volatility characteristic of runs for which 
safety priority is low.  Both adherence to rules and procedures and the effectiveness of rules and 
procedures increase.  Thus, results support the hypothesis that learning behaviors can contribute 
to safety most effectively when safety is given a high priority by managers.   
 Figure 13 also contains a couple of somewhat counter intuitive results.  First, the 
effectiveness of rules and procedures actually increases more when safety is given a low priority, 
due to the fact that more learning is possible when the number of incidents is higher.  This is 
precisely the dilemma faced by high hazard organizations: given that reliability is a “dynamic 
non-event” (Weick, 1987, pg. 118), individuals must learn from small events, understand “that 
inertia is a complex state,” and guard against complacency.  Here, we see that the most reliable 
organization, that which exhibits both learning and a high safety priority, avoids complacency by 
maintaining a high level of adherence, and also learns efficiently from a small and decreasing 
incident rate.  Although the overall stock of knowledge is smaller, the average learning per 
incident is higher and lessons are more consistently adhered to.   
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Figure 13: Comparing learning under assumptions of both low and high safety priority.  When 
safety is given a high priority, the resulting improvement in safety is substantial.  Adherence also 
rises and reactive management pressure is no longer necessary.   
 
The situation is even more challenging when incidents are rare despite a safety culture 
that is weak, as was the case at NASA during the time leading up to the Challenger disaster.  If 
incidents are rare and safety priority is low, production pressure will gradually crowd out safety 
adherence as above, a sign of the organization becoming complacent.  In addition, the lack of 
incidents limits learning, meaning that a pattern of behavior similar to the low priority – low 
learning trajectory in figure 13 is possible.  Thus, in organizations like NASA where incidents are 
rare, the importance of safety priority is paramount.   
A second interesting result from Figure 13 concerns the role of overt management action 
in an organization for which both learning is active and the priority of safety is high.  As the blue 
line in the bottom right graph of Figure 13 shows, overt management emphasis under this 
scenario is zero at all times.  In other words, due to the positive effects of learning and the 
decreased influence of production pressure, the incident rate never reaches a point at which 
managers feel the need to respond reactively.  Much has been said about the disadvantages of 
single loop learning and of a leadership style that overly emphasizes compliance.  Should we 
emphasize eliminating these behaviors by choice, or will single loop learning disappear as a 
natural result of implementing more effective policies elsewhere?   
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Figure 14 summarizes the results of the above analysis by showing four distinct outcomes 
in which two policies are varied, the strength of learning and the priority of safety.  These 
outcomes are also presented in Table 1.  (Again safety priority refers to the degree to which 
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individuals are encouraged to place safety above productivity.)  A number of conclusions can be 
drawn.   
 First, it is clear from the resulting behavior that whatever assumptions are made about the 
effectiveness of rules and procedures or the strength of learning, making safety a high priority by 
limiting production pressure is by far the highest leverage policy available to managers seeking to 
prevent accidents.  Both runs in which safety is a high priority reach and sustain lower incident 
rates than those for which safety is a low priority, regardless of the strength of learning.  
Furthermore, safety priority can also be a source of reliability: because production pressure is 
contained, gains in improving the incident rate are sustained and are not vulnerable during the 
inevitable times when work pressures become large.  As a result, the incident rate remains at 
consistent levels rather than fluctuating in response to each new wave of management emphasis.   
 This result may provide insight into the nature of reliability in organizations that do 
hazardous work.  While part of reliability certainly involves developing rich norms of 
communication so as to effectively respond to cues (Weick, 1987), reliability also includes the 
ability to prevent the type of oscillatory behavior that can result when management pressure or 
single loop learning is the dominant form of control.  An oscillating incident rate is the hallmark 
of a reactive organization, where successive crises lead to short term fixes that persist only until 
the next crisis.  Partly, eliminating this behavior must involve cultural issues that are unique to 
each context.  However, there is also a general lesson: management decisions must involve giving 
individuals the time that they need to complete safety tasks without feeling pressure to abandon 
them.   
 
Figure 14: Comparing the Incident rate for four different scenarios.  Giving safety a high priority 
is by far the most effective policy, with learning providing a substantial incremental benefit only 
when safety priority is high.   
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 A second important lesson concerns the interaction between learning and safety priority.  
Figure 14 illustrates clearly that the gains from learning are far more significant when priority is 
high than when priority is low.  In fact, by month 36 many of the gains from learning in the high 
learning – low priority organization have been entirely lost by gradual erosion in adherence to 
rules and procedures.  In contrast, when safety priority is high, learning creates a large 
improvement.  Figure 15 illustrates this point even more dramatically: even under assumptions of 
extremely effective learning (in blue), gains eventually erode almost entirely when the priority of 
safety is low.  Thus, a key contribution is that an understanding of the physical structure of task 
completion and of work pressure is essential to supporting learning in an organization.  If 
adherence to rules and procedures is allowed to erode, it makes little difference how good rules 
and procedures are in the first place.     
 
Figure 15: The case of extremely effective learning.  If priority is low, eventually safety will 
erode, as above 
 
Interestingly, this observation may be loosely related to what Carroll, Rudolph and 
Hatakenaka (2002) term ‘structuring’ in their four stage model of organizational learning.  To use 
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their words, “structuring is a collective achievement of consistency and predictability by 
integrating knowledge into routines and cultural meanings that are institutionalized throughout 
the organization.”  In other words, this last stage of learning involves institutionalizing 
knowledge gained from learning so that it is used consistently, a concept that in many ways 
contains our notion of ‘adherence to rules and procedures.’  Indeed, we find that supporting 
learning by maintaining adherence is crucial, and that if lessons are not institutionalized and 
instead erode, learning is easily undermined.  ‘Safety priority,’ as it is defined in the safety 
climate literature, may be one essential element of making these lessons endure.   
 As a final note, it is important to again consider these conclusions in the context of 
organizational learning.  Organizations seeking to learn from accidents and develop a culture of 
safety may continuously refine a stock of knowledge that increases the effectiveness of rules, as 
this simulation represents.  However, there is also a higher level of learning that transcends what 
can be captured within a single simulation model.    In addition, a simulation may itself serve as a 
boundary object (Carlile, 2004) that allows managers to experience fundamental learning about 
the dynamics of their organization as a whole.  In this case, managers learn not only about the 
specifics of individual incidents, but also about the importance of understanding the tradeoff 
between productivity and safety.  The organizational response to accidents is complex, and by 
adapting the framework proposed in this study to specific organizations we hope to contribute 
also to this larger form of learning.   
 
Acknowledgements 
Work reported herein was supported, in part, by the Singapore Defence Science and 
Technology Agency (DSTA). 
 
 25
References 
 
Argyris, C., R. Putnam, et al. (1985). Action science:[concepts, methods, and skills for research 
and intervention], Jossey-Bass. 
Barling, J., E. K. Kelloway, et al. (2003). "High-quality work, job satisfaction, and occupational 
injuries." Journal of Applied Psychology 88(2): 276–83. 
Barling, J., C. Loughlin, et al. (2002). "Development and test of a model linking safety-specific 
transformational leadership and occupational safety." J Appl Psychol 87(3): 488-96. 
Borenstein, Seth. “Deadly Mining Method Used Often,” The Associated Press, August 6, 2007 
Brown, R. L. and H. Holmes (1986). "The use of a factor-analytic procedure for assessing the 
validity of an employee safety climate model." Accid Anal Prev 18(6): 455-70. 
Carlile, P. R. (2004). "Transferring, Translating, and Transforming: An Integrative Framework 
for Managing Knowledge Across Boundaries." Organization Science 15(5): 555-568. 
Carroll, J. S. (1993). "Out of the Lab and Into the Field: Decision Making in Organizations." 
Social Psychology in Organizations: 38-62. 
Carroll, J. S. (1998). "Organizational learning activities in high-hazard industries: The logics 
underlying self-analysis." Journal of Management Studies 35(6): 699. 
Carroll, J. S. (1998). "Safety Culture as an Ongoing Process: Culture Surveys as Opportunities for 
Enquiry and Change." Work and Stress 12(3): 272-284. 
Carroll, J. S., J. W. Rudolph, et al. (2002). "Learning from experience in high-hazard 
organizations." Research in Organizational Behavior 24: 87-137. 
Cheyne, A., A. Oliver, et al. (2002). "The architecture of employee attitudes to safety in the 
manufacturing sector A. Cheyne, ." Personnel Review 31(6): 649-670. 
Clarke, S. (1999). "Perceptions of organizational safety: implications for the development of 
safety culture." Journal of Organizational Behavior 20(2): 185-198. 
Clarke, S. (2000). "Safety culture: under-specified and overrated?" International Journal of 
Management Reviews 2(1): 65-90. 
Clarke, S. (2006). "Safety climate in an automobile manufacturing plant: The effects of work 
environment, job communication and safety attitudes on accidents and unsafe behaviour." 
Personnel Review 35(4): 413-430. 
Cooke, D. L. and T. R. Rohleder (2006). "Learning from incidents: from normal accidents to high 
reliability." System Dynamics Review 22(3): 213-239. 
Cox, S., J. M. Tomas, et al. (1998). "Safety Culture: The Prediction of Commitment to Safety in 
the Manufacturing Industry." British Journal of Management 9(s 1): 3-11. 
Cyert, R. M. and J. March (1963). A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. 
Dedobbeleer, N. and F. Beland (1991). "A safety climate measure for construction sites." Journal 
of Safety Research 22(2): 97-103. 
Edmondson, A. C. (2002). Managing the Risk of Learning: Psychological Safety in Work Teams, 
Division of Research, Harvard Business School. 
Embrey, D. E. (1992). "Incorporating management and organisational factors into probabilistic 
safety assessment." Reliability Engineering & System Safety 38(1): 199-208. 
Gershon, R. R., C. D. Karkashian, et al. (2000). "Hospital safety climate and its relationship with 
safe work practices and workplace exposure incidents." Am J Infect Control 28(3): 211-21. 
Glendon, A. I. and N. A. Stanton (2000). "Perspectives on safety culture." Safety Science 34(1): 
193-214. 
Goldberg, A. I., E. M. Dar-El, et al. (1991). "Threat Perception and the Readiness to Participate in 
Safety Programs." Journal of Organizational Behavior 12(2): 109-122. 
Griffin, M. A. and A. Neal (2000). "Perceptions of safety at work: a framework for linking safety 
climate to safety performance, knowledge, and motivation." J Occup Health Psychol 5(3): 
347-58. 
 26
Guldenmund, F. W. (2000). "The nature of safety culture: a review of theory and research." 
Safety Science 34(1): 215-257. 
Hofmann, D. A. and F. P. Morgeson (1999). "Safety-related behavior as a social exchange: The 
role of perceived organizational support and leader-member exchange." Journal of applied 
psychology 84(2): 286-296. 
Hofmann, D. A. and A. Stetzer (1996). "A Cross-Level Investigation of Factors Influencing 
Unsafe Behaviors and Accidents." Personnel Psychology 49(2). 
Hofmann, D. A. and A. Stetzer (1998). "The Role of Safety Climate and Communication in 
Accident Interpretation: Implications for Learning from Negative Events." The Academy of 
Management Journal 41(6): 644-657. 
Huang, Y. H., P. Y. Chen, et al. (2004). "Quality of the Execution of Corporate Safety Policies 
and Employee Safety Outcomes: Assessing the Moderating Role of Supervisor Safety 
Support and the Mediating Role of Employee Safety Control." Journal of Business and 
Psychology 18(4): 483-506. 
Humphrey, S. E., H. Moon, et al. (2004). "Decision making and behavior fluidity: How focus on 
completion and emphasis on safety changes over the course of projects." Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 93(1). 
Isla Diaz, R. and D. Diaz Cabrera (1997). "Safety climate and attitude as evaluation measures of 
organizational safety." Accid Anal Prev 29(5): 643-50. 
Janssens, M., J. M. Brett, et al. (1995). "Confirmatory Cross-Cultural Research: Testing the 
Viability of a Corporation-Wide Safety Policy." The Academy of Management Journal 
38(2): 364-382. 
Katz-Navon, T. A. L., E. Naveh, et al. (2005). "Safety Climate in Health Care Organizations: A 
multidimensional Approach."  The Academy of Management Journal 48(6): 1075-1089. 
Lee, T. (1998). "Assessment of safety culture at a nuclear reprocessing plant." Work and stress 
12(3): 217-237. 
Leveson, N. G., B. Barrett, et al. (2005). Modeling, Analyzing and Engineering NASA's Safety 
Culture: Phase 1 Final Report. Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
M Goldenhar, L., L. J. Williams, et al. (2003). "Modelling relationships between job stressors and 
injury and near-miss outcomes for construction labourers." Work & Stress 17(3): 218-240. 
Marais, K., J. H. Saleh, et al. (2006). "Archetypes for organizational safety." Safety science 
44(7): 565-582. 
Mearns, K., R. Flin, et al. (1998). "Measuring safety climate on offshore installations." Work and 
stress 12(3): 238-254. 
Minami, N and S. Madnick (2007).  “Reducing Combat Vehicle Accidents via Improved 
 Organizational Processes."  MIT Working Paper, available at
 http://web.mit.edu/smadnick/www/wp/2007-02.pdf 
Morecroft, J. D. W. (1985). "Rationality in the Analysis of Behavioral Simulation Models." 
Management Science 31(7): 900-916. 
Naveh, E., T. Katz-Navon, et al. (2005). "Treatment Errors in Healthcare: A Safety Climate 
Approach." Management Science 51(6): 948-960. 
Neal, A. and M. A. Griffin (2002). "Safety Climate and Safety Behaviour." Australian Journal of 
Management 27(2). 
Nelson, Jennifer and B Hankinson. “High End Fare, with Side order of Violations,” The Boston 
Globe, August 26, 2007 
Neuman, William (2007). "Safety Violations Cited for Deaths in Subway Work."  The New York 
Times, August 2, 2007.   
Oliva, R. and J. D. Sterman (2001). "Cutting Corners and Working Overtime: Quality Erosion in 
the Service Industry." Management Science 47(7): 894-914. 
Paich, M. and J. D. Sterman (1993). "Boom, Bust, and Failures to Learn in Experimental 
Markets." Management Science 39(12): 1439-1458. 
 27
Perrow, C. (1984). Normal accidents: Living with high-risk technologies, Basic Books, New 
York, NY. 
Pidgeon, N. (1997). "The limits to safety? Culture, politics, learning and man-made disasters." 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 5(1): 1-14. 
Pidgeon, N. F. (1991). "Safety Culture and Risk Management in Organizations." Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Psychology 22(1): 129. 
Reason, J. (1998). "Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice." Work and Stress 12(3): 293-
306. 
Repenning, N. (1999). "A Simulation-Based Approach to Understanding the Dynamics of 
Innovation Implementation." 
Repenning, N. P. and J. D. Sterman (2002). "Capability Traps and Self-Confirming Attribution 
Errors in the Dynamics of Process Improvement." Administrative Science Quarterly 47(2): 
265-295. 
Roberts, K. H. (1990). "Some Characteristics of One Type of High Reliability Organization." 
Organization Science 1(2): 160-176. 
Roberts, K. H., S. K. Stout, et al. (1994). "Decision Dynamics in Two High Reliability Military 
Organizations." Management Science 40(5): 614-624. 
Rudolph, J. W. and N. P. Repenning (2002). "Disaster Dynamics: Understanding the Role of 
Quantity in Organizational Collapse." Administrative Science Quarterly 47(1): 1-30. 
Sagan, S. D. (1993). The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, 
Princeton University Press. 
Schein, E. H. (1985). Organizational culture and leadership. San Franciso, Jossey-Bass 
Publishers. 
Senge, P. M. (1992). The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, 
Century Business. 
Sterman, J. D. (2000). Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex 
World, Irwin/McGraw-Hill. 
Sterman, J. D. (2000). "Learning In and About Complex Systems." Reflections: The SoL Journal 
1(3): 24-51. 
Sterman, J. D., R. Henderson, et al. (2007). "Getting Big Too Fast: Strategic Dynamics with 
Increasing Returns and Bounded Rationality." Management Science 53(4): 683. 
Tucker, A. L. (2003). "Why hospitals don’t learn from failures: Organizational and psychological 
dynamics." California Management Review 45(2): 55-72. 
Tucker, A. L., I. M. Nembhard, et al. (2007). "Implementing New Practices: An Empirical Study 
of Organizational Learning in Hospital Intensive Care Units." Management Science 53(6): 
894. 
Weick, K. E. (1987). "Organizational culture as a source of high reliability." California 
Management Review 29(2): 112-127. 
Wright, C. (1986). "Routine deaths: Fatal accidents in the oil industry." Sociological Review 
34(2): 265-288. 
Zohar, D. (1980). "Safety climate in industrial organizations: theoretical and applied 
implications." J Appl Psychol 65(1): 96-102. 
Zohar, D. (2000). "A group-level model of safety climate: testing the effect of group climate on 
microaccidents in manufacturing jobs." J Appl Psychol 85(4): 587-96. 
Zohar, D. (2002). "The effects of leadership dimensions, safety climate, and assigned priorities on 
minor injuries in work groups." Journal of Organizational Behavior 23(1): 75-92. 
Zohar, D. and I. Erev (2007). "On the difficulty of promoting workers' safety behaviour: 
overcoming the underweighting of routine risks." International Journal of Risk Assessment 
and Management 7(2): 122-136. 
 
 28
Appendix I: Model Diagrams 
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Model Diagram: Task Completion Sector 
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Appendix II: Complete Listing of Model Equations 
Note: Model is written using the Vensim modeling software, available from www.vensim.com 
 
Number of Rules and Procedures= 
 5.76 
 ~ Procedures/task 
 ~  | 
 
Decrese in Safety Knowledge= 
 Safety Knowledge/Time for learning to 
become obsolete 
 ~ 1/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Safety Requirements per Task= 
 Number of Rules and 
Procedures*Adherence to Rules and 
Procedures*Time required per procedure 
 ~ hours/task 
 ~  | 
 
Reference Safety Knowledge= INITIAL( 
 Safety Knowledge) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Table for Effect of Number of Incidents on 
Learning( 
 [(0,0)-
(6,2)],(0,0.8),(1,1),(2,1.1),(3,1.2),(4,1.3),(5,1.4)) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Increase in Safety Knowledge= 
 Effectiveness of Current Learning 
 ~ 1/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Relative Safety Knowledge= 
 Safety Knowledge/Reference Safety 
Knowledge 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Reference Incident Rate for Learning= 
 INITIAL(Incident Rate) 
 ~ Incidents/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Effectiveness of Current Learning= 
 Strength of Learning*Effect of Number 
of Incidents on Learning 
 ~ 1/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Time for learning to become obsolete= 
 48 
 ~ months 
 ~  | 
 
Relative Incident Rate= 
 Incident Rate/Reference Incident Rate 
for Learning 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Fraction of Incidents that are reported= 
 1 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Safety Knowledge= INTEG ( 
 Increase in Safety Knowledge-Decrese 
in Safety Knowledge, 
  Initial Effectiveness of 
Learning* Time for learning to become obsolete) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Table for Effect of Safety Knowledge on 
Effectiveness of Rules and Procedures( 
 [(0,0)-
(3,1)],(0,0.05),(0.321101,0.192982),(0.678899,0.
359649),(1,0.5),(1.54128,0.714912\ 
 
 ),(2.11927,0.877193),(2.54128,0.95614)
,(3,1)) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Effectiveness of Rules and Procedures= 
 Table for Effect of Safety Knowledge 
on Effectiveness of Rules and 
Procedures(Relative Safety Knowledge\ 
  ) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Effect of Number of Incidents on Learning= 
 Table for Effect of Number of Incidents 
on Learning(Relative Incident Rate) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Effectiveness of Safety Behavior= 
 31
 Adherence to Rules and 
Procedures*Effectiveness of Rules and 
Procedures 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Initial Effectiveness of Learning= 
 0.5 
 ~ 1/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Planned Safety Requirements per task= 
 Number of Rules and Procedures*Time 
required per procedure 
 ~ hours/task 
 ~  | 
 
Strength of Learning= 
 0.5 
 ~ 1/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Desired Staff Level= 
 (1-Switch for proactive 
management)*Total Desired Work Rate/Normal 
work amount+ 
 Switch for proactive 
management*Planned Desired Staff Level 
 ~ ppl 
 ~  | 
 
Employee Productivity= 
 Task completion/Staff Level 
 ~ tasks/Month/ppl 
 ~  | 
 
Switch for proactive management= 
 0 
 ~ dmnl [0,1,1] 
 ~  | 
 
Planned Desired Staff Level= 
 (Desired Task completion rate*(Time 
per task+Planned Safety Requirements per 
task)/Normal work amount\ 
  ) 
 ~ ppl 
 ~  | 
 
Perceived Management emphasis on safety= 
 smooth(Reported Incident Rate Relative 
to Acceptable Incident Rate,Time to perceive 
management emphasis on safety\ 
  ) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Fractional Increase in adherence to Rules and 
Procedures= 
 Change in adherence from personal 
threat+Change in adherence from schedule 
pressure+\ 
  Change in adherence from 
management emphasis 
 ~ 1/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Base Rate of new Tasks= 
 1000 
 ~ tasks/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Incident Rate Acceptable to Management= 
 4 
 ~ Incidents/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Reported Incident Rate Relative to Acceptable 
Incident Rate= 
 Reported Incident Rate/Incident Rate 
Acceptable to Management 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Change in adherence from schedule pressure= 
 Table for fractional increase from 
schedule pressure(Schedule Pressure) 
 ~ 1/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Change in adherence from management 
emphasis= 
 Table for effect of management 
emphasis on adherence(Perceived Management 
emphasis on safety\ 
  ) 
 ~ 1/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Change in adherence from personal threat= 
 Table for fractional change from 
personal threat(Perceived Personal Threat) 
 ~ 1/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Change in Adherence to Rules and Procedures= 
 MIN(Maximum Increase in 
Adherence,Adherence to Rules and 
Procedures*Fractional Increase in adherence to 
Rules and Procedures\ 
  ) 
 ~ 1/Month 
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 ~  | 
 
Reported Incident Rate= 
 Incident Rate*Fraction of Incidents that 
are reported 
 ~ Incidents/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Staff Level= 
 smooth3(Desired Staff Level,Time to 
adjust Staff Level) 
 ~ ppl 
 ~  | 
 
Table for effect of management emphasis on 
adherence( 
 [(0,0)-
(2,1)],(0,0),(1,0),(1.19878,0.140351),(1.5474,0.2
45614),(2,0.3)) 
 ~ 1/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Maximum Increase in Adherence= 
 (1-Adherence to Rules and 
Procedures)/Minimum time to increase 
adherence 
 ~ 1/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Rate of New Tasks= 
 Base Rate of new Tasks*Input 
 ~ tasks/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Minimum time to increase adherence= 
 0.1 
 ~ Month 
 ~  | 
 
Time to perceive management emphasis on 
safety= 
 2 
 ~ Month 
 ~  | 
 
Table for fractional change from personal threat( 
 [(0,-0.06)-(2,1)],(0,-
0.01),(1,0),(1.24159,0.5),(1.5107,0.8),(2,1)) 
 ~ 1/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Table for fractional increase from schedule 
pressure( 
 [(0.9,-2)-(1.2,0.1)],(0.9,0.1),(1,0),(1.05,-
0.8),(1.1,-1.8)) 
 ~ 1/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Adherence to Rules and Procedures= INTEG ( 
 Change in Adherence to Rules and 
Procedures, 
  0.5) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Capacity= 
 Staff Level*Normal work amount 
 ~ hours/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Capacity Utilization= 
 Table for Capacity Utilization(Schedule 
Pressure) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Desired Task completion rate= 
 Task Backlog/Desired Time to 
complete tasks 
 ~ tasks/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Desired Time to complete tasks= 
 1 
 ~ Month 
 ~  | 
 
Effect of Safety Behavior on Incident Rate= 
 Table for Effect of Adherence on 
Incident Rate(Effectiveness of Safety Behavior) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Exponential Growth Rate= 
 0 
 ~ 1/Month 
 ~ The exponential growth rate in 
the input. 
 | 
 
Exponential Growth Time= 
 0 
 ~ Month 
 ~ The time at which the 
exponential growth in the input begins. 
 | 
 
Incident Rate= 
 Reference Incident Rate*Effect of 
Safety Behavior on Incident Rate 
 ~ Incidents/Month 
 ~  | 
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Input= 
 1+STEP(Step Height,Step Time)+ 
 (Pulse Quantity/TIME 
STEP)*PULSE(Pulse Time,TIME STEP)+ 
 RAMP(Ramp Slope,Ramp Start 
Time,Ramp End Time)+STEP(1,Exponential 
Growth Time)*(EXP(\ 
  Exponential Growth 
Rate*Time)-1)+ 
 STEP(1,Sine Start Time)*Sine 
Amplitude*SIN(2*3.14159*Time/Sine 
Period)+STEP(1,Noise Start Time\ 
  )*RANDOM NORMAL( -4 , 4 
, 0 , Noise Standard Deviation , Noise Seed ) 
 ~ Dimensionless 
 ~ The test input can be 
configured to generate a step, pulse, linear ramp, 
\ 
  exponential growth, sine wave, 
and random variation.  The initial value of \ 
  the input is 1 and each test 
input begins at a particular start time.  The \ 
  magnitudes are expressed as 
fractions of the initial value. 
 | 
 
Reference Incident Rate= 
 1 
 ~ Incident/Month 
 ~ The theoretical minimum 
incident rate, or the incident rate arising due to \ 
  chance, assuming rules and 
procedures are maximally effective and are \ 
  followed completely. 
 | 
 
Noise Seed= 
 1000 
 ~ Dimensionless 
 ~ Varying the random number 
seed changes the sequence of realizations for \ 
  the random variable. 
 | 
 
Noise Standard Deviation= 
 0 
 ~ Dimensionless 
 ~ The standard deviation in the 
random noise.  The random fluctuation is \ 
  drawn from a normal 
distribution with min and max values of +/-  4.  
The \ 
  user can also specify the 
random number seed to replicate simulations.  
To \ 
  generate a different random 
number sequence, change the random number 
seed. 
 | 
 
Noise Start Time= 
 0 
 ~ Month 
 ~ The time at which the random 
noise in the input begins. 
 | 
 
Normal work amount= 
 8*5*4 
 ~ hours/Month/ppl 
 ~  | 
 
Perceived Incident Rate= 
 smooth(Incident Rate,Time to perceive 
incident Rate) 
 ~ Incident/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Perceived Personal Threat= 
 ZIDZ(Perceived Incident Rate, 
Threshold incident rate) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Pulse Quantity= 
 0 
 ~ Dimensionless*Month 
 ~ The quantity added to the input 
at the pulse time. 
 | 
 
Pulse Time= 
 0 
 ~ Month 
 ~ The time at which the pulse 
increase in the input occurs. 
 | 
 
Ramp End Time= 
 1e+009 
 ~ Month 
 ~ The end time for the ramp 
input. 
 | 
 
Ramp Slope= 
 0 
 ~ 1/Month 
 ~ The slope of the linear ramp in 
the input. 
 | 
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Ramp Start Time= 
 0 
 ~ Month 
 ~ The time at which the ramp in 
the input begins. 
 | 
 
Schedule Pressure= 
 Total Desired Work Rate/Capacity 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Sine Amplitude= 
 0 
 ~ Dimensionless 
 ~ The amplitude of the sine wave 
in the input. 
 | 
 
Sine Period= 
 10 
 ~ Month 
 ~ The period of the sine wave in 
the input. 
 | 
 
Sine Start Time= 
 0 
 ~ Month 
 ~ The time at which the sine 
wave fluctuation in the input begins. 
 | 
 
Step Height= 
 0 
 ~ Dimensionless 
 ~ The height of the step increase 
in the input. 
 | 
 
Step Time= 
 0 
 ~ Month 
 ~ The time at which the step 
increase in the input occurs. 
 | 
 
Table for Capacity Utilization( 
 [(0,0)-
(1.5,1.2)],(0,0),(0.5,0.5),(0.75,0.75),(1,1),(1.1284
4,1.08947),(1.2844,1.13684\ 
  ),(1.49541,1.15)) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Table for Effect of Adherence on Incident Rate( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,5)],(0,5),(0.183486,3.50877),(0.25,3),(0.5,2),(
0.755352,1.27193),(1,1)) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~  | 
 
Task Backlog= INTEG ( 
 Rate of New Tasks-Task completion, 
  Base Rate of new 
Tasks*Desired Time to complete tasks) 
 ~ tasks 
 ~  | 
 
Task completion= 
 (Capacity*Capacity Utilization)/Total 
Time per task 
 ~ tasks/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Threshold incident rate= 
 6 
 ~ Incidents/Month 
 ~ The incident rate at which an 
individual perceives an imminent personal \ 
  threat 
 | 
 
Time per task= 
 5 
 ~ hours/task 
 ~  | 
 
Time required per procedure= 
 0.1 
 ~ hours/procedure 
 ~  | 
 
Time to adjust Staff Level= 
 6 
 ~ months 
 ~  | 
 
Time to change rules adherence habits= 
 2 
 ~ Month 
 ~  | 
 
Time to perceive incident Rate= 
 0.5 
 ~ Month 
 ~  | 
 
Total Desired Work Rate= 
 Desired Task completion rate*(Time 
per task+Safety Requirements per Task) 
 35
 ~ hours/Month 
 ~  | 
 
Total Time per task= 
 Time per task+Safety Requirements per 
Task 
 ~ hours/task 
 ~  | 
 
***************************************
***************** 
 .Control 
***************************************
*****************~ 
  Simulation Control Parameters 
 | 
 
FINAL TIME  = 36 
 ~ Month 
 ~ The final time for the 
simulation. 
 | 
 
INITIAL TIME  = 0 
 ~ Month 
 ~ The initial time for the 
simulation. 
 | 
 
SAVEPER  =  
        TIME STEP 
 ~ Month [0,?] 
 ~ The frequency with which 
output is stored. 
 | 
 
TIME STEP  = 0.0625 
 ~ Month [0,?] 
 ~ The time step for the 
simulation. 
 | 
 
 
 
